The first NEBA Seminar focusing on neuroethical conceptions of personal identity and the impact of emerging neurotechnologies was held between August and October 2023. In a context of rapid advances in neuroscience, the development of neurotechnologies for clinical, military, educational, entertainment, and other uses forces us to ask how these developments affect our understanding of who and what we are. Addressing those questions requires interdisciplinary collaboration. The participants reflected that commitment, bringing perspectives from philosophy, neurology, law, education, and other fields.
The seminar began with a deceptively simple question: what does the debate about personal identity in neuroethics consist of? The specialized literature can produce a rhetorical ambiguity that makes the conceptual terrain difficult to navigate. Personal identity can be understood in at least two ways.
Metaphysical and epistemic perspectives
From a metaphysical perspective, the question is about the ontological nature of personhood. A theory should characterize the essential properties of persons and provide criteria for identity over time. It should help us address scenarios that strain our pre-theoretical intuitions: could two people exchange bodies and remain the same persons? Is someone who has lost every memory, character trait, and psychological feature still the same person? How should we understand dissociative identity disorder?
From an epistemic perspective, the issue is psychological and pragmatic. These theories do not seek to unveil the nature of personhood, but to clarify how we understand and use the concept. Instead of asking “What are persons?”, they ask “What do we mean by personhood?” Narrative approaches often appeal to intersubjective criteria of acceptance and negotiation to determine which stories successfully constitute personal identities. This opens difficult questions about alienation, discrimination, and cases in which a person’s preferred narrative is not accepted by their social environment.
The seminar found it necessary to make this distinction explicit. Narrative conceptions are best understood as epistemic accounts, rather than as descriptions of the metaphysical nature of personhood. They therefore face a delicate balance: remaining faithful to our pre-theoretical intuitions while revising and extending those intuitions to address novel cases.
From conceptual analysis to clinical practice
Emerging neurotechnologies such as deep brain stimulation may affect self-understanding, agency, and personal narrative. Relational approaches, which recognize the active role of institutional, cultural, and interpersonal contexts, offer especially valuable tools for addressing these cases.
The seminar also demonstrated that these tools extend beyond hypothetical academic cases. One participant, a neurologist working with people who have Parkinson’s disease, must explain the risks and benefits of deep brain stimulation and accompany patients who receive it. His clinical experience brought necessary reality to the theoretical discussion. In turn, he reported that the seminar’s work had already helped him approach a patient consultation from a new perspective.
The interdisciplinary synergy between theoretical analysis and concrete practice is one of neuroethics’ most powerful features. It is my hope that the Seminar on Personal Identity and Neurotechnologies conveyed that commitment and exemplified NEBA’s dedication to research and public understanding.
References
- Baylis, Françoise (2011). “The self in situ: A relational account of personal identity.”
- Baylis, Françoise (2013). “‘I Am Who I Am’: On the Perceived Threats to Personal Identity from Deep Brain Stimulation.” Neuroethics, 6(3), 513–526.
- Mackenzie, Catriona & Walker, Mary (2015). “Neurotechnologies, personal identity and the ethics of authenticity.” In Springer Handbook of Neuroethics.
- Schechtman, Marya (1990). “Personhood and personal identity.” Journal of Philosophy, 87(2), 71–92.
- Schechtman, Marya (2011). “The narrative self.” In The Oxford Handbook of the Self.
- Goering, Sara et al. (2017). “Staying in the Loop: Relational Agency and Identity in Next-Generation DBS for Psychiatry.” AJOB Neuroscience, 8, 59–70.